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Our aim is to analyze the effect of public subsidies on the development path of Italian small
and medium enterprises (SMEs). Public subsidies to SMEs have been often used with the
aim of favoring economic growth in less developed regions. The main theoretical arguments
justifying this intervention are related to the idea that public subsidies can solve lack-of-
capital problems deriving from asymmetric information. According to Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), public subsidies to rationed firms can reduce the informational gap, leading subsidized
firms to reduce their financial constraints and to increase their investment levels. Results
obtained modelling leverage, performance and investment behaviour in a panel of around
1,900 enterprises over the years 1989 to 1994 seem to confirm the working hypotheses.
However, they can not be considered as conclusive and further research is needed in this
context.
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I. Introduction
Public subsidies to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have often played a
relevant role in industrial policies to stimulate economic growth in less developed
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regions, assuming that public subsidies can solve lack-of-capital problems which
limit firms’ investment decisions.
From a purely theoretical perspective, informational asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders can justify government intervention aimed at helping firms
to reduce their financial constraints and increase their planned investment levels
(De Long and Summer 1991, Bergström 1998). However, few empirical studies have
analyzed their impact. Our aim is to evaluate the effects of informational asymmetry
on the financial structure of Italian SMEs using the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model
as theoretical support. For this purpose, we have analyzed data drawn from the
MedioCredito Centrale database, which includes qualitative and quantitative
information on 3696 firms for 1989-1991 and 4389 firms for 1992-1994. Approximately
50% of firms have obtained public subsidies during this period. Our results seem
to confirm the relevant effects of public subsidies on firms’ leverage, as well as the
role of public subsidies to help SMEs overcome credit rationing conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we discuss asymmetric
information and credit rationing as theoretical justifications for public subsidies.
In section III we describe the analyzed panel of firms. In section IV we introduce
the empirical model, and in Section V we present the results obtained from fitting
the proposed models. The last section gives concluding remarks and outlines the
future research agenda.
II. Economic background
For the financing constraint literature, imperfections in capital markets create a
gap between internal and external sources of funds (see Hubbard 1998 for a survey).
Our empirical model explores whether the policy of subsidies to SMEs helps to
counteract the external credit restrictions that firms face. We assume firms can
obtain external financial resources only from the private sector (bank loans) or
from the public sector (subsidies). We also assume that only SMEs know their real
financial structure, the real strength of the investment project and the effective
intention to repay the debt, i.e., firms have superior private information. Hence, the
bank manager makes decisions under asymmetric information, and operates under
moral hazard and adverse selection risk. In this context, the bank can use the
subsidy like a sort of added guarantee in case of a project’s default, since the
government usually repays part (or the totality) of the loan to banks.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explained the choice among different financing sources
under conditions of asymmetric information and credit rationing. Asymmetric
information can lead to credit rationing conditions by modifying the risk-return CREDIT RATIONING AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 169
distribution; this fact encourages banks to refuse capital for investments and
produces divergence between capital demand and supply. Financing refusal derives
from banks’ rational behaviour; since banks act in an asymmetric information
market, equilibria are not efficient and firms with less profitable investment projects
obtain capital. Therefore, asymmetric information can explain asymmetric
distribution of credit among firms with identical characteristics: the lenders, not
being aware of the exact bankruptcy likelihood for the firms, know only that this
likelihood is positive and therefore choose to increase debts’ cost. The firm accepts
to invest only in riskier projects which can produce higher income levels, which
are needed to cover debts. The result is that the lender cannot avoid to select the
riskier project and therefore must accept the risk of the firm. In presence of excess
demand, the lender has different maxima corresponding to the rates with the lower
adverse selection likelihood for credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
Furthermore, rationing conditions reduce financial resources not only for new
investment, but also for employment (Nickell and Nicolitsas 1999).
From a theoretical perspective, loan guarantees can help solve credit rationing
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1983). Thus, a possible justification for public intervention
derives from credit rationing conditions in financial markets. Hoff and Stiglitz (1998),
assuming monopolistic competition, showed that subsidies could increase the
interest rate or market attrition in credit markets characterized by moneylenders
and bank credit. The effect on credit supply is positive: firms without financial
resources from banks can use public subsidies to fund their projects. If subsidies
heavily affect credit demand, the result is that rationing persists in the market and
the equilibrium is not market clearing.
Rather than leading to under-investment, asymmetric information could drive
to over-investment in equilibrium (de Meza and Webb 1987, 1990): in this case,
only capital taxes can drive credit market to optimal values. Moreover, de Meza
and Webb (1992, 2000) argue that credit rationing can be considered as endemic
also in fully informative markets, and that rationing and “excessive lending” can
coexist in equilibrium, even if they do not consider explicitly government
intervention. Within this perspective, the “appropriate policy is to increase the
attractiveness of alternatives to self-employment rather than to subsidize lending”
(de Meza and Webb 2000, p. 217). As can be easily noted, subsidies are not
univocally claimed as an efficient solution to lack-of-capital problems; in fact, their
economic efficiency is far from clear. Capital subsidies could lead to over-investment
and excess of production capacity due to distortions in input relative prices;
therefore, it would be desirable to achieve labor market improvements with active
labor policies, rather than capital subsidies to firms (Begg and Portes 1993). This JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 170
viewpoint is corroborated by Schwartz and Clements (1999) and Tollison (1997).
Looking at the excess-of-credit literature, subsidies allow less profitable firms
to survive paying a higher cost for credit; subsidized firms obtain new public
financial resources and the equilibrium is market clearing without rationing (de
Meza and Webb 1987). The empirical literature in any case does not produce a
clear-cut set of results regarding the correlation among profitability, credit rationing
and subsidies (Cowling and Mitchell 2003); this reflects the lack of a unifying
theoretical framework to describe relationships between these variables.
All these phenomena affect firms’ financial structure, generating disequilibria
between financial sources and corresponding investments. According to the
literature discussed above, subsidies can be used as partial substitution for bank
debt. By reducing moral hazard and adverse selection risk, they contribute to
reduce the SMEs rationing conditions. In this case, obtained subsidies affect
positively SMEs leverage, which represents a synthetic variable measuring firms
internal financial dynamic.
III. Data
The MedioCredito database collects information from two surveys conducted
on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms during the period 1989-1994: the first
survey, which took place in 1991, covers the period 1989 to 1991, while the second
survey, conducted in 1994, covers the period 1992 to 1994. Firms with 11 to 500
employees have been included in the sample according to a stratified sampling
design reflecting geographical and size distribution of Italian firms. Firms with
more than 500 employees have all been included. In both surveys qualitative and
quantitative data (balance sheets for the 1989-1994 period) have been collected
providing information on ownership structure, availability of external finance,
entitlement to public subsidies, and successful introduction of products and
processes. The analyzed panel includes all those enterprises with less than 250
employees which were present in the database for the whole period 1989 to 1994;
following this selection scheme, we considered 1919 firms participating in both
surveys with information available for all years from 1989 to 1994. We now describe
the primary responses and the covariates in detail.
To define the debt structure, we use the leverage variable (Lev) which represents
the ratio between total bank debts (short and long term) and total assets. We have
used as scale variable total assets rather than equity capital because all firms are
small-medium sized, not listed in the stock exchange and most of them are family
owned. As a consequence, equity capital is often a symbolic balance sheet item, CREDIT RATIONING AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 171
extremely volatile and not representative of firm’s stock of total assets.
Sub represents the binary variable indicating that the firm has been subsidized
during years 1989 to 1994. It dynamically divides the sample into two different
sets: the firms who have received a subsidy and the others (the control sample).
This variable represents the direct action of the State in the economic system. The
subsidies we have considered for the present analysis are those given to improve
firms’ technological and capital endowment (see Table A1 for more details).
Exp is a dummy variable representing the international state of a firm: 1 if the
firm exports, 0 otherwise. It is important to analyze the empirical connection between
export and debt structure, since exporting firms face additional exchange rate risk.
Pat is a factor to identify prevalent activity sector among Traditional Sector
(Pat=1), Scale Sectors (Pat=2), Specialized Sectors (Pat=3), and Hi-tech Sectors
(Pat =4).
Rat is the binary variable representing rationed firms. It is based on reported
answers to similar questions present in both questionnaires. We used this factor
to test the idea that credit rationing can be the result of a rational response of the
bank system in presence of asymmetric information in order to preserve the spread
of project revenues (see Stiglitz-Weiss 1981). According to Petersen and Rajan
(1994), when the relation between fund demand and supply can not be accounted
for, credit rationing cannot be measured directly through debt ratios. The rationed
condition should be estimated through firms’ marginal investments, classifying
firms as rationed if they used the more expensive source of funds. This approach
allows to solve the problem that a small firm’s owner tends to give “bad answers”
to magnify firm’s financial constraints. Unfortunately, our data do not allow to
adopt this approach, and therefore we had to define the variable only on the basis
of answers to the questionnaire.
Rnd is a measure of firms’ profitability; according to Nickell (1996) it is defined
as:
,
where Pbt identifies profits before tax, Dep is the depreciation rate, R represents
interest payments, c is the cost of capital (set to 0.07), K is the stock of capital, and
Va represents the added value; this variable represents a proxy for expected returns
deriving from investment activities.
KL represents the current value of firm’s capital/labor ratio, while Cde represents
the ratio between financial cost of capital and the sum of external financial sources
of firm i at time t (acquired capital).
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Risc and Sdroi represent proxies for firms’ risk. The former is the ratio between
provision for risk and charges (a balance item in which firms directly quantify their
operating risk by creating an ad hoc reserve) and total assets (Becchetti and
Trovato 2000). Risc can also be considered as a measure of internal financing
choice, since firms can use the excess of legal provisions to finance themselves,
thus avoiding to pay taxes (provisions reduce the earnings considered for taxes).
The result is that the higher the taxes, the higher is the willingness to use this
internal financial provision. Since Risc can not be considered as an effective measure
of firms’ risk, we also used the standard deviation of Risc, Sdroi for this purpose.
Dur is the natural logarithm of firms’ age in 1989, while Loc is a dummy variable
representing firm localization. The factor takes value 1 for North Italy and 2 for
Centre and South Italy.
IV. Models
Usually, regression models are based on the assumption that the analyzed
responses are independent. However, with panel data modified approaches should
be considered, since responses for the same firm in different periods are likely to
show a significant dependence. We have used first order Markov regression to
estimate parameters for a set of multivariate models, where primary responses are
the SME debt structure, as measured by leverage, the demand for new investment,
the cost of debt and performance indicators. Covariates consist of firm’s principal
characteristics: firm localization, access to public subsidies, financial structure,
expected returns of investment projects. Using this modelling approach, we
implicitly assume that past values of each response directly affect its current
values and introduce a flexible association structure between responses
corresponding to the same firm. In particular, we assume that the actual level of
debt ratio is a function of its past levels in order to take into account possible
dynamics involving the repayment process. In fact, firms must repay bank debts
contracted in the past to finance old investment projects: the higher the quantity
of past contracted debt, the higher the actual level of debt used to repay the old
debt.
We used a maximum likelihood approach with correlated error terms, since it is
likely that unobserved features of the economic environment influencing a certain
primary response (for example leverage) could be related to the other responses
for each time point t.
The model for leverage can be defined as follows: CREDIT RATIONING AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 173
( ) 0 1 1 23 456 it it it it it it it E Lev Lev Sub Exp Pat Rat Loc bb b b b b b - =+ + + + + + +
789 1 0 it it it it Rnd Risc Sdroi Dur bbb b +++ +
(2)
              .
It is worth noting that, given the adopted Markov assumptions, the regression
parameters should be interpreted as short term effects on deviations of actual
levels from past leverage levels. As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1994), the
leverage variable is likely to be jointly determined by the firm’s specific demand for
capital and the banks supply of credit. In such a case, regression parameter
estimates could suffer from simultaneous equation bias and only data on funds
dynamics could help solve this problem. In the present context, we tested for the
effects of endogeneity of regressors (firm return and firm risk) through a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman (DWH)-type test. Details are reported in the next Section.
With respect to demand for new investments, the current value of the firm
capital/labor ratio (KL) can be modelled as a function of its past values, as well as
of subsidies (Sub) and rationing conditions (Rat). These assumptions lead to the
following specification:
In the previous equation, as well as in the following, the variable Subrat
represents a polytomous variable which has been defined combining the dummy
variables Sub and Rat, with reference category Subrat=0 (Sub=0, Rat=0), and
active categories Subrat=1 (Sub=1, Rat=0), Subrat=2 (Sub=0, Rat=1), Subrat=3
(Sub=1, Rat=1).
Furthermore, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) postulated that subsidies affect the cost
of the bank debt; to test these assumptions we use the following model:
( ) 01 12 it it it E Cde Cde Subrat bb b - =+ +
where Cde represents, as described above, the ratio between the financial cost of
capital and the sum of external financial sources  for firm i at time t.
To test the influence of subsidies and rationing conditions on profitability and
risk we employed the following models:
Descriptive mean values for the modelled response variables conditioned on
the adopted categorical covariates are displayed in Table 1.
01 12 () it it it EK L K L S u b r a t bb b - =+ + (3)
(4)
01 12 () it it it E Rnd Rnd Subrat bb b - =+ + (5)
01 12 () it it it E Sdroi Sdroi Subrat bb b - =+ + (6)
.
,
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Table 1. Descriptive mean values for Lev, KL, Cde, Rnd, and Sdroi
      State                Lev                 KL                    Cde                    Rnd                Sdroi
Sub=0 0.216 3.907 0.0476 0.275 0.124
Sub=1 0.243 4.310 0.0477 0.345 0.105
Rat=0 0.223 4.118 0.0458 0.317 0.116
Rat=1 0.264 4.201 0.0535 0.261 0.070
Exp=0 0.201 4.029 0.0444 0.269 0.126
Exp=1 0.239 4.122 0.0489 0.321 0.110
Pat=1 0.246 4.065 0.0501 0.285 0.115
Pat=2 0.214 4.254 0.0444 0.353 0.117
Pat=3 0.213 3.945 0.0472 0.289 0.008
Pat=4 0.207 3.932 0.0469 0.279 0.129
V. Results
A. Leverage
In the following, only results obtained by fitting the primary model for leverage
will be discussed in detail. The remaining models have been fitted in order to test
for endogeneity bias (parameter estimates for all other models are reported in Table
A2 in the Appendix.).
Table 2 details parameter estimates for the leverage model as well as the p-
values obtained from testing for endogeneity of regressors, for selection bias and
for model misspecification. The adjusted R2 shows that almost 70% of variability is
explained by the adopted model.
The main result is the significant and positive effect of Subit on firms’ leverage:
those SMEs which have been subsidized have higher leverage compared to those
not subsidized. This result seems to be consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981):
the lender, operating in a context of asymmetric information, reads the signal of
outsourcing debt as an increased bankruptcy risk for the firm and can not increase
the rate of interest because of moral hazard and adverse selection. In the presence
of public subsidies (at the same interest rate applied by banks), the result is a right
shift in the credit demand. The lender could give more credit in addition to public
subsidies: the subsidized credit is not enough to cover the global amount of
investment, and the firm has to demand new credit at the market interest rate. The
final result is increased leverage and an excess of exposure with the banking CREDIT RATIONING AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 175
Sub .0047 .0024 1.96 0.050
Rat .0148 .0032 4.66 0.000
Pat=2 -.0093 .0029 -3.25 0.001
Pat=3 -.0067 .0032 -2.09 0.036
Pat=4 -.0218 .0081 -2.69 0.007
Loc=2 -.0030 .0032 -0.94 0.348
Sdroi -.0234 .01371 -1.71 0.088
Exp=1 .0057 .0033 1.77 0.076
Rnd -.0004 .0032 -0.14 0.889
Risc -.1800 .0439 -4.10 0.000
Levt-1 .8101 .0097 83.16 0.000
Dur -.0001 .0001 -1.79 0.073
Cons .0504 .0058 8.75 0.000
Deviance 54.089
Adj. R-squared 0.678




Notes: A maximum likelihood approach with correlated error terms was used. The p-values for
the DWH, HST and HTSM tests are reported here. The parameter estimates of the remaining
models are reported in Table A2.
Table 2. (Continued) Model for leverage (Lev)
Variable                       Coef.                 Std. Err.                           z                          Pr>|z|
system. In fact, according to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) subsidized firms are granted
more credit and invest more; the cost of debt and the interest rate are higher if
subsidies are not deducted (gross of subsidies) and the equilibrium is not market
clearing. According to De Meza and Webb (1987), subsidized firms are also granted
more credit and invest more; the cost of debt and the interest rate (gross of subsidies)
faced by subsidized firms are not lower than those for not subsidized firms. In this
case, subsidized firms have a lower profitability with respect to those firms which
have not been subsidized, and the equilibrium is market clearing without rationing.
Results obtained by modelling only the leverage variable do not allow to
discriminate between these  theories; proper modelling of the links between firms
profitability and projects’ risk conditions could help us in understanding the
consistency of our results with these theories. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 176
Another important result is that firms declaring to be credit rationed are more
leveraged as indicated by estimated effects reported in Table 2. The connection
between leverage, credit rationing and performance may help us understand whether
rationing generates market failures or correctly recognizes inefficient projects,
something we turn to below.
The estimated effect of Rndit is not substantially different from zero. This is an
unexpected result, which might be explained as follows. The Italian bank system
seems to look only at firms’ ability to repay the debt, i.e., to firms’ structural
conditions: firm sector (Pat), reputation (Dur), firm risk (Sdroi), subsidies (Sub)
and past debt history (Levt-1). Current profitability should be important to determine
the firm’s ability to repay; however, profitability does not seem to be persistent in
the analyzed sample (as shown in Table A2) and this could be interpreted  as actual
profits being a bad predictor of future ones. Therefore banks’ behaviour can be
considered as a rational choice on the use of profitability variables in predicting
firms’ ability to repay the debt.
The relation between asymmetric information and returns (if asymmetric
information is strong high returns should lead to reduced bank debts) does not
seem to hold. But this relation is still useful if we consider the Risc variable as a
measure of internal financial provision. In this case, higher asymmetric conditions
and higher tax rigidities lead to more explicit internal financing choices.
The estimated relation between leverage and risk (Sdroi) presents a negative
sign: in presence of outstanding debt there could be a conflict between shareholders
and debtholders (Diamond 1989). This is because the debtholders demand higher
risk premia to compensate for increased bankruptcy risks (due to increased debts)
so that riskier firms find debt financing relatively more expensive and have lower
debt-equity ratios in equilibrium (Myers 1977).
B. Conditional values
Table 3 shows predicted values conditional only on the observed covariates.
Their meaning is quite different from the results in Table 2, that are conditional on
past values of the response variable and other covariates in the regression models.
Credit rationing indicates a failure in financial markets when a firm does not
obtain credit by the banking system regardless of whether the project could yield
an expected return higher than the lending rate. Table 3 shows that rationed firms
have a lower performance and result more leveraged than the control sample, i.e.
not rationed firms. Therefore, the bank system tends to automatically screen out
applicants using monitoring tools based on performance and leverage. CREDIT RATIONING AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 177
Table 3. Predicted values for Lev, Sdroi, Rnd, KL, and Cde
                                  Lev                   Sdroi                 Rnd                   KL                    Cde
Sub=1,Rat=1 .280 .238 .286 4.435 .054
Sub=1,Rat=0 .242 .253 .292 4.325 .047
Sub=0,Rat=1 .250 .264 .202 3.986 .056
Sub=0,Rat=0 .214 .261 .278 3.969 .046
Total .236 .256 .279 4.172 .048
An important aspect of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model is that public
subsidies are an important factor to support firms’ demand for new investments;
as shown from predicted values reported in Table 3, subsidies seem to produce an
increased propensity for capital intensive investment. In any case, the higher
value of the capital/labour ratio cannot be considered as a measure of firms’ health.
Italian firms might choose techniques with high capital intensity to avoid rigidities
and inefficient conditions in the labour market, and this leads to lower profitability
of capital.
The next hypothesis to be analyzed regards the effects of subsidies on the
cost of capital (Cde). If firms are considered riskier, they face either more expensive
conditions for credit or a rationing condition (De Meza and Webb 1987). Table 3
shows that rationed and not subsidized firms have an expected cost for capital
slightly greater than rationed and subsidized firms, while for the control sample
(not rationed firms) subsidies slightly increase the cost of debt.
Table 3 shows that rationed and subsidized firms have a lower predicted
profitability and a lower predicted risk when compared with those not rationed but
subsidized. The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model can help us in interpreting the
result: when a firm is rationed it is excluded from the market and therefore it obtains
a lower level of capital for investments. In this case, the firm has a lower global
level of profitability. Subsidies include in the credit market firms which were
previously excluded: therefore, firms could obtain the expected profitability from
the investment. Subsidies seems to improve predicted profitability for rationed
firms: in any case, the rationed firms have a greater predicted leverage and a lower
predicted performance. Subsidies also affect firm risk and the lender has the
incentive to give more credit if the firm is subsidized: the result is that the firm is
more leveraged and has a cost of capital greater than the other. But, if the firm is
rationed, the subsidy seems to slightly reduce the cost of capital.
According to results in Tables 2 and 3, subsidies can be not enough to clean
the market, and therefore firms remain rationed in presence of a strong increase in JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 178
the credit demand. Rationing condition dynamically exists also in the presence of
subsidies, since around 26% of firms that have been subsidized in 1989 remain
rationed (or declare to be rationed) also in the second time period (covering 1992 to
1994). According to the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) conclusion, the equilibrium is not
market clearing.
C. Causality
One relevant issue regarding the potential excess of credit in the market has been
discussed, among others, by de Meza and Webb (2000). In their perspective, public
subsidies have to be considered as a complement to bank financing and they are
jointly used by firms. Should this not be the case, the conditional distribution of
subsidies given past values of subsidies and leverage would be the same as that
given past values of subsidies alone. In more formal words, we could expect Granger
noncausality between leverage and subsidies, which can be stated as:
11 1 () ( ) it it it it it f Sub Sub f Sub Sub Lev -- - |=| ,
where f(.) denotes the conditional density of Subit. To test this hypothesis, we
performed a likelihood ratio test comparing two logistic regression models for the
primary response, Subit, with covariates given by, respectively, Subit-1 and Levit-1,
and Subit-1 alone. The results (
2
21 22 9 c, @. , p-value  01 3 @. ) show that noncausality
between subsidies and leverage can not be rejected, i.e., complementarity of
subsidies and bank financing is not well supported by the analyzed data.
We found in Table 3 that rationed firms have a lower performance and result
more leveraged, so the bank system tends to screen out applicants using
performance and leverage. Nevertheless, the above causal relationship can be
also reversed: i.e., firms are less profitable because they suffer a rationing condition.
To test these competing hypotheses we performed two Granger noncausality to
verify the null hypotheses that:
11 1 () ( ) it it it it it f Rat Rat f Rat Rat Rnd -- - |=| ,                                                             (8)
11 1 () ( ) it it it it it f Rat Rat f Rat Rat Lev -- - |=| ,                                                              (9)
To be more precise, we performed a LR test comparing two conditional
regression  models  for  the  primary  response Ratit, to understand if a prior
lower  profitability  lead to rationing or not. Obtained results for the first test
(c2
2,1 @ 0.18, p-value @ 0.6753) show that firms are rationed whether they perform
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well or not. Moreover, if we consider leverage as causal factor for the rationing
condition, then we can affirm that the past financial exposure is a causal factor
for credit rationing (c2
2,1 @ 4.38, p-value @ 0.0364). We performed an additional
Granger test to verify if rationing condition influence current profitability:
11 1 () ( ) it it it it it f Rnd Rnd f Rnd Rnd Rat -- - |=| ,                                                          (10)
The obtained results show that profitability is heavily influenced by the
rationing condition, since the chi-square statistic for the effect of Ratit-1 on Rndit
is @ 6.82, with a p-value near to zero.
From the LR tests, we can conclude that the Italian bank system is not able to
capture firms’ capacity to improve expected performance and, more likely, that it
screens out bad applicants on the basis of an automatic monitoring system which
denies credit to applicants having ex ante higher leverage than the control sample
after adjusting for all available controls.
D. Statistical tests
Several statistical tests have been performed on the data to check whether
valid inferences can be made conditionally on them. To test for endogeneity of
regressors, we employed a DWH test by using as instruments Pat, Zone, Dur,
Levt-1, Levt-2, Levt-3. The aim was that of testing for endogeneity of regressors such
as Rendit, Sdroiit; it should however be noted that a non significant value of this
test statistic only implies that, if present, endogeneity does not significantly
influence parameter estimates (Davidson and Mackinnon 1993). The result (see
Table 2) shows that ML parameter estimates are consistent and that we can avoid
considering alternative methodologies.
We should remark that we considered only those firms participating in both
surveys with less than 250 employees. To check whether the regression results
were robust to this sample selection, we employed the Heckman Two Step Method
(HTSM, Heckman 1976). The obtained p-value shows that there is not enough
empirical evidence to assume selection bias is present. Last, we employed a so
called Hausman-type test (HST in the following) for model misspecification
(Hausman 1978). The basic idea of the Hausman-type tests is that MLe estimators
[ b ˆ ] and their potential alternative [b
~ ] are, under correct model specification,
consistent with the true parameter bo, while if the model is not correctly specified
they do not converge to the same limit (Farhmeir and Tutz 1994). In the present
context, we used as competitor a maximum Quasi-Likelihood estimator [b
~ ], which JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 180








= å . The test statistic can be represented by:
1 ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( ) ()
T
h wC bb b b bb
- =- , - %%%  ,                                                                              (11)
where  ˆˆ ˆ () CV V bb ,= - % % represents the distance between the asymptotic covariance
matrix of  ˆ b  and the asymptotic covariance matrix of b %. It can be shown that
h w has, under certain regularity conditions, an asymptotic 
2
r c distribution with
() rr a n k C = . Two issues arise when using HST; first, the finite sample distribution
could not be adequately approximated by a 
2
r c distribution. Second, despite the
singularity of C, the estimated  ˆ Cmay be nonsingular or have higher rank than. In
any case, the test seems to suggest that our model is correctly specified (
2
12 0 c @ ),
as shown by the corresponding p-value reported in Table 2.
VI. Concluding remarks
Our model, applied to a panel of Italian SMEs, show empirical results which are
substantially consistent with the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. In fact, firms’
leverage is positively related to the presence of public subsidies; moreover, not
rationed but subsidized firms present increased capital intensive investments, but
profitability and leverage do not show a negative and significant correlation. The
results are not conclusive, since alternative economic theories are consistent with
them; only analyzing the process leading to projects’ selection could improve the
global understanding of the analyzed phenomena.
We find a negative and significant relation between leverage and Risc. This
can be partially explained by the fact that profitability is not persistent in the
analyzed sample; the hypothized negative correlation of profitability on leverage
has been “replaced” in a certain sense by the negative and significant relation
between leverage and Risc summarizing internal financing choice.
Our results seem to be consistent with the assumption that public subsidies
with interest loan decrease the effective cost of debts for the firm but they do not
change the rate for the banks. The result is that moral hazard and adverse selection
are decreasing: in this way the banks can increase their credit supply. Since the
firms feel the subsidy like a direct reduction of the payed interest rate, they demand
more credit. The shift of both demand and supply curves of credit produce a
higher equilibrium interest rate (gross of subsidies). Therefore once the subsidy
has been granted, the bank system tends to increase the interest rate and the firms
can use more credit but with a higher cost. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
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are starker when compared with the positive effects of public subsidies and hence
these negative effects persist in the credit market also after public subsidies.
However, caution is needed when considering that the present results
substantially support the theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); alternative theoretical
specifications can be consistent as well and a final interpretation can be given
only on the basis of empirical data about the efficiency of subsidies which, however,
are not available in the analyzed sample.
Appendix
Table A1. Summary features of principal subsidy laws operating in Italy between
1989 and 1997
Law                          Instruments   Limits to potential
          recipients
Law 64 Guarantee fund up to 80% of the guarantee Small and medium
provided from the Credit consortia of private sized firms in South
firms which supports the investment of Italy
Law 488 Grants for investment which renovate Ranking based on
capital stock differentiated according to size three criteria (financial
and geographical location of the recipient. independence, investment
Grants are provided in three instalments independence from soft
of equal amount. The law is cofinanced by loan; employment
UE Structural Funds impact)
Law 46/82 Soft loans which cover from 35% to 70%
(R&D of total investment costs. The rate is
program) 40-50%lower (small-medium firms), 75%
lower (firms from the South) than the
market rate. Grants up to 70% of
investment costs
Law 657/77 “Guarantee fund” for medium-long term Small/medium firms
(Guarantee bank credit up to 50% of investment
program) financing
Law 1142/66 Soft loans for investment projects of Small-medium firms
(BEI-EEC small-medium firms in domestic or foreign
program). currency up to 50% of total investment
costs. Currency specific rates are decided
by BEI and may be either fixed or variable JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 182
Table A1. (Continued) Summary features of principal subsidy laws operating in
Italy between 1989 and 1997
Law                         Instruments    Limits to potential
           recipients
Law 240/81 Soft loans for a maximum of 10 year for All firms belonging to
(Consortia material and immaterial investments up to “consortia”
program)  70% of total investment costs. The  rate
is 60% of market rate for firms in the South.
Law 44/86 Firms and individuals in
(Young South, underdeveloped
entrepreneurs’ areas, and mountain areas
program) of Italy
Law 1329/65 Soft loans for leasing or purchase of tangibl Small/medium firms
(Sabatini e investment goods by small-medium firms
program) up to a maximum of 3 billion liras with a
variable rate under the market rate according
to firm size and location
Law 949/52 Soft loans for leasing or purchase of tangible Small/medium firms
(SME up to a maximum of 4 billion liras with a
program) variable rate under the market rate according
to firm size and location
Law 227/77 Soft loans for medium long term export
(Export commercial credit (up to 85% of total
program) commercial credit). The incentive consists
of the positive difference between the market
rate and that applied by the Italian firm to
the foreign importer
Law 394/81 Soft loans for foreign direct investments of Exporting firms
(FDE program) firms which are already exporting up to
85% of total investment costs with a ceiling
of 3 billion liras. The rate is 40% of the
market rate
Law 49/87 Soft loans for investments in LDC countries
(LDCFDE at a rate of 1% for a maximum of 30 years
program)
Source: Bagella and Becchetti (1997). CREDIT RATIONING AND THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 183
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